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ACTA – RISKS OF THIRD-PARTY
ENFORCEMENT FOR ACCESS TO MEDICINES
Brook K. Baker1
ABSTRACT
In its current near-final draft form, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement [ACTA] being negotiated plurilaterally—and largely secretly—
by a self-selected group of countries proposes to allow preliminary and final
injunctive relief against third parties (third-party enforcement) to prevent
infringement of intellectual property rights and/or to prevent infringing
goods from entering into the channels of commerce. There is lingering
uncertainty whether the relevant civil enforcement section will apply to the
entire range of intellectual property rights or whether patents will be
excluded. If patents are excluded, the dangers in ACTA would be reduced
but not eliminated—new globalized forms of third-party enforcement would
still pose unprecedented risks to the lawful trade of generic medicines.
Extending third-party liability and imposing interlocutory and/or permanent
injunctions against (1) innocent active pharmaceutical ingredient suppliers
whose materials are used in the manufacture of patent infringing medicines
or in mislabeled products without their knowledge, (2) transporters who use
international channels of trade through countries where the “patent
manufacturing fiction” or “trademark confusion” claims might apply, and
(3) other actors in the global procurement and supply of medicines, could
interfere with goal of robust generic competition and access to medicine.
Under the risk of preliminary and permanent injunctions, and contempt of
court sanctions for violating such injunctions, API suppliers would
predictably shy away from selling base ingredients to generic producers,
entities like the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(Global Fund) the U.S. PEPFAR Supply Chain Management System
(SCMS) could be deterred from funding the purchase of generic medicines,
and shippers might refuse to transport finished generic medicines through
ordinary transshipment routes involving ACTA signatories. Health activists
must collaborate globally to eliminate or at the very least reduce these risks.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In its current, near-final draft form,2 the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) being negotiated plurilaterally—and largely secretly—
by a self-selected group of countries3 proposes to allow preliminary and
final injunctive relief against third parties (third-party enforcement) to
prevent infringement of intellectual property rights and/or to prevent
infringing goods from entering into the channels of commerce. There is
lingering uncertainty whether the relevant civil enforcement and injunction
section will apply to the entire range of intellectual property rights4 covered
by the TRIPS Agreement5 or whether patents will be excluded as proposed
by the U.S.6 If patents are exclude the health risks in ACTA will be
reduced but not eliminated. In the context of access to medicines, new
globalized forms of third-party enforcement, like its predecessor,
intermediary service provider liability, poses unprecedented risks to the
2

Consolidated Text—Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Informal Predecisional/
Deliberative Draft: Oct. 2, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Official Text - October 2, 2010”
hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA – Oct. 2, 2010] (reflecting changes made during September
2010 Tokyo Round).
3
In October 2007 the United States, the European Community, Switzerland and Japan
simultaneously announced that they would negotiate a new intellectual property
enforcement treaty. Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Jordan,
Morocco, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Canada have joined the negotiations.
4
According to proposed Art. 1.X: Definitions, “intellectual property means all
categories of intellectual property that are the subject of Sections 1 though 7 of Part II of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.” ACTA – Oct. 2,
2010. Those sections of TRIPS, in turn cover: copyrights and related rights; trademarks;
geographical indications; industrial designs; patents; layouts (topographies) of integrated
circuits; and protection of undisclosed information.
5
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C of
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm.
6
ACTA – Oct. 2, 2010, supra note 2, n.2: {US: For the purpose of this Agreement,
Parties agree that patents do not fall within the scope of this Section.}.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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lawful trade of generic medicines. Extending third-party enforcement and
imposing interlocutory and permanent injunctions against (1) innocent
active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) suppliers whose materials are used
in the manufacture of patent infringing medicines or in mislabeled products
without their knowledge, (2) transporters who use international channels of
commerce through countries where the “patent manufacturing fiction” or
“trademark confusion” claims might apply, and (3) other actors in the
global procurement, supply, and even registration of medicines, could
interfere with the goal of robust generic competition and access to
medicine. Under the risk of injunctions and contempt of court penalties,
API and other suppliers would predictably shy away from selling base
ingredients to generic producers, entities like the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund), the U.S. PEPFAR Supply
Chain Management System (SCMS) could be deterred from funding the
purchase of generic medicines, and shippers might refuse to transport
finished generic medicines through ordinary transshipment routes involving
ACTA signatories. These threats to access to medicines must be addressed
by a global coalition of AIDS, health, and trade activists.

II.

ACTA’S KEY PROVISIONS: MOVEMENT FROM INTERMEDIARY TO THIRDPARTY ENFORCEMENT

The Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement dated April 20107 (April Predecisional Draft) contained
multiple threats to access to medicines. The mostly widely discussed issue
involved the seizure of goods-in-transit following the detention of multiple
drug shipments by Dutch customs authorities in 2008 and 2009 under the
authority of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003.8 Dutch authorities
applied the judicially created rule that the IP status of in-transit medicines
should be judged under the fiction that the medicines had been
manufactured in the Netherlands9 and thus responded to Big Pharma seizure
7

Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Public Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:
April 21, 2010 PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE,
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow “Official Consolidated ACTA Text
Prepared for Public Release, April 21, 2010” hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Apr.
21, 2010].
8
Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196/7) (EC), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:196:0007:0014:EN:PDF.
9
Cf. Sosecal v. Sisvel, District Court in The Hague (2008), available at
http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/PDF_December09/The%20Hague%20DC%20Sisvel%20
v%20Sosecal%20EN.pdf. See Frederick J. Abbott, Seizures of Generic Pharmaceuticals in
Transit Based on Allegations of Patent Infringement: A Threat to International Trade,
Development and Public Welfare, 1 W.I.P.O.J., 43, 47 (2009); Frank Eijsvogels, SISVEL V.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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requests by impounding and delaying shipments of life-saving medicines
bound from India, where they had been lawfully manufactured and
exported, to countries in Africa and Latin America, where they would have
been lawfully imported, marketed and consumed. These seizures and the
E.U.’s delayed and defensive response to expressions of diplomatic and
human rights concern prompted India and Brazil to initiated dispute
resolution procedures at the World Trade Organization.10
Unfortunately, the risks of the April Predecisional Draft to public health
and to the lawful international trade of generic medicines are not limited to
border-seizures by customs agents policing phantom patent rights. A risk
also arose from provisions that subjected so-called “intermediaries” to
interlocutory and permanent injunctions, known elsewhere as interdicts.
The use of such injunctions against API manufacturers, international
shippers, and other participants in the global trade of medicines could
inhibit supply and distribution systems and thereby deter generic entry,
robust generic competition, and legitimate international trade of generic
medicines of assured quality, especially if the civil enforcement provisions
were to be applied with respect to all intellectual property rights as
proposed by some negotiators, including the E.C.11
Bracketed Article 2.X.2: Injunctions provided that “The Parties [may]
shall ensure that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction
against [infringing] intermediaries whose services are used by a third party
to infringe an intellectual property right.”12 Footnote 8 noted that the
“conditions and procedures relating to such injunction will be left to each
Party’s legal system.” Earlier leaks revealed that this article was proposed

SOSECAL: ACTING AGAINST TRANSIT GOODS STILL POSSIBLE UNDER THE ANTI PIRACY
REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS, IP Intelligence Eur. (Howrey L.L.P., Amsterdam,
Netherlands), 2008, 10.
10
European Union and a Member State [India] – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit,
WTO Dispute Settlement DS408, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds408_e.htm and European Union
and a Member State [Brazil] – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WTO Dispute
Settlement DS409, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds409_e.htm; see generally Third
World Network, India, Brazil raise dispute over EU drug seizures, 6924 SUNS May 17,
2010, available at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100509.htm;
Intellectual Property Watch, Consultations on WTO Drug Transit Case Continue,
September 16, 2010, available at http://www.ipwatch.org/weblog/2010/09/16/consultations-on-wto-case-on-drugs-in-transit-continue/;
C.H. Unnikrishan, India may move WTO as it seeks to resolve EU dispute, livemint.com,
October 10, 2010, available at http://www.livemint.com/2010/10/11225420/India-maymove-WTO-as-it-seeks.html.
11
ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7, art. 2.1 contains alternative coverage
proposals: any intellectual property right vs. copyrights and related rights and trademarks
only.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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by the European Commission. Similarly, bracketed Article 2.5X provided
that “[a]n interlocutory injunction may also be issued, under the same
conditions {to prevent any imminent infringement of an intellectual
property right}, against any [infringing] intermediary whose services are
being used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right.”13 It
was undecided whether the provision of injunctions against intermediaries
would be mandatory (shall … ensure) or permissive (may … ensure). In
either event, there would be an in terrorem effect. A related concept to
intermediary liability was the proposed criminal responsibility of persons or
entities that incite, aid, or abet cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or
copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale.14 The enforcement
of intermediary liability would have been facilitated by proposed Article
2.4, which allowed broad discovery of intermediary activities, particularly
those involving production and distribution, during civil enforcement
procedures against alleged infringers.15
The key operative term, “intermediaries,” was undefined in the April
Predecisional Draft, as was the alternative term “infringing intermediary.”
Likewise, what constituted “services” used by another to infringe an
intellectual property right was also unclear. Previously, the concept
“intermediary services” had been analyzed most closely with respect to
internet service providers (ISPs).16 In these circumstances, an ISP that
merely provided facilities that were used by others for an infringement, i.e.
to download a digital copy of a song, book or movie, might be interdicted.
Given the lack of definition, access-to-knowledge activists were concerned
12

ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7.
Id.
14
Id. art. 2.15.2.
15
Id. art. 2.4 [“Without prejudice to other statutory provisions which, in particular,
govern the protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of
personal data,] Each Party shall provide that in civil judicial proceedings concerning the
enforcement of [intellectual property rights][copyright or related rights and trademarks],
its judicial authorities shall have the authority upon a justified request of the right holder,
to order the [alleged] infringer [including an alleged infringer] to provide, [for the purpose
of collecting evidence] any [relevant] information [information on the origin and
distribution network of the infringing goods or services][in the form as prescribed in its
applicable laws and regulations] that the infringer possesses or controls, [where
appropriate,] to the right holder or to the judicial authorities. Such information may
include information regarding any person or persons involved in any aspect of the
infringement and regarding the means of production or distribution channel of such goods
or services, including the identification of third persons involved in the production and
distribution of the infringing goods or services or in their channels of distribution. [For
greater clarity, this provision does not apply to the extent that it would conflict with
common law or statutory privileges, such as legal professional privilege.]”).
16
These concerns have not been completely eliminated in the new ACTA text.
Michael Geist, ACTA Lite: The U.S. Cave on the Internet Chapter Complete, October 6,
2010, available at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5352/125/.
13
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that the terms “intermediaries” or “infringing intermediaries” might not
only be applied to ISPs but might also be extended to libraries, cultural
institutions, and educational institutions, although their application to mail
or telecommunications providers was deemed unlikely.17 Internet and
copyright activists were also concerned that providing for injunctions might
create incentives for ISPs and other intermediaries to take on new roles as
extra-judicial enforcement arms of the courts and, most especially, of rights
holders.
In part because of health activist concern about the impact of
intermediary liability on access to medicines18 and because of a lack of
clarity about the territorial reach of injunctive powers, the intermediary
liability language of in the April Predecisional Draft was dropped in the
September 2010 Consolidated Text of ACTA and the concept of third-party
enforcement was introduced in its place. Pursuant to the revised Civil
Enforcement—Provision Measures section: "Each Party shall provide that
its judicial authorities shall have the authority to order prompt and effective
provisional measures: against a party, or where appropriate, against a third
party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction, to
prevent an infringement of any intellectual property rights from occurring,
and in particular to prevent infringing goods from entering into the
channels of commerce."19 Likewise, with respect to its Civil Enforcement
Injunctions section: “Each Party shall provide that, in civil judicial
proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its
judicial authorities shall have the authority to issue an order against a party
to desist from an infringement, and inter alia, an order to that party or,
where appropriate, to a third party over whom the relevant judicial
authority exercises jurisdiction, to prevent infringing goods from entering
into the channels of commerce.”20
Admittedly, the necessity of having a personal and territorial
jurisdiction over a third party is at least referenced by the amended text,21

17

See Kimberlee Weatherall, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT:
ANALYSIS OF THE JANUARY CONSOLIDATED TEXT (April 2010), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context=kimweatherall.
18
See, e.g., Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, International
Experts Find that Pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Threatens Public Interests
(Jun. 23, 2010), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta-communique;
Berkeley Declaration on Intellectual Property Enforcement and Access to Medicines, 2010,
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Berkeley_Declaration.pdf; AVAAZ, ACTA
– People Before Profit, available at http://www.avaaz.org/en/acta/.
19
ACTA, supra note 2, Art. 2.5:1(a) (emphasis added).
20
Id. Art. 2.X.1 (emphasis added).
21
Injunctions are usually limited in their application to activities occurring within the
geographic territory of the issuing jurisdiction, but jurisdiction sometimes extends to
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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but an additional confusing phrase—entering into the channels of
commerce—enters the picture. It is unclear why provisional measures can
be used to address any intellectual property infringement, of which
preventing the infringing goods from entering the channels of commerce is
but one example, but that final injunctions are limited solely to preventing
infringing goods from entering into channels of commerce. Paradoxically,
provisional measures might be used to temporarily enjoin production,
before full commercialization, but final injunctions might not be able do so,
depending on the eventual interpretation of how long, deep, and wide the
channels of commerce actually are.
The April Predecisional Draft provision requiring production of
information "regarding any person or persons involved in any aspect of the
infringement and regarding the means of production or distribution channel
of such goods and services," has been adopted unchanged.22 With respect
to criminal enforcement, the April Predecisional Draft provision has been
modied somewhat to exclude incitement and to require that "Each party
shall ensure that criminal liability for aiding and abetting is available under
its law."23

III.

APPLYING INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY AND THIRD-PARTY ENFORCEMENT
TO PHARMACEUTICALS

In the context of access to medicines, the concept “intermediary
services” was quite ominous. Services were obviously provided by ISPs
that allowed suppliers to market medicines on-line, and, also in the
pharmaceutical context, by shipping agents.24 However, services were also
extraterritorial activities that adversely impact in-territory interests. Under a strict
territorial rule, to enjoin third-party enablement of IP infringement in India, first there
would have to be an infringement of a territorial IP right in India that the third party was
facilitating, and second, the injunction would have to be issued in India against the
importation, manufacturing, or export of the third-party-provided service or materials.
However, if more expansive extra-territorial jurisdiction applied, the transit country could
issue an injunction against the third party’s activities in other countries to the extent that
those activities had or would predictably impact in-territory events. In such circumstances,
a third party might be enjoined in the Netherlands for supplying APIs to an infringing
generic manufacturer in India that had or intended to transship through the Netherlands.
A full discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is clearly beyond the scope of this short
article, but a discussion of some of the relevant principles can be found in American Law
Institute, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008).
22
ACTA, supra note 2, Art. 2.4.
23
Id. art. 2.14:4.
24
See Thomas Schachl, German Federal Supreme Court Confirms Broad
Responsibility of Forwarding Agents for Handled Goods; Increased Requirements to
Examine Compliance of Handled Goods With German Patent Law, THE BARDEHLE
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP

8

ACTA: Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines

supplied by lawyers and accountants, communications service providers,
and factory workers. Although we do not usually consider suppliers of
components—for example, API and inert ingredient suppliers—to be
providing a “service,” if components were deemed to be services, then all
medicines component suppliers could have been found to be
“intermediaries” who had contributed services instantiated in to the
manufacture and distribution of the final-product, an IP-infringing generic
medicine, and would thus be subject to an injunction.25
Finally, and perhaps more ominously, many others who helped to fund
or facilitate purchases of generic drugs as they as they moved through the
stream of international commerce from producer to consumer could have
faced intermediary liability. For example, the Global Fund solicits and
funds country-led proposals for funding priority disease prevention,
treatment, and care.26 More to the point, it now provides a voluntary
pooled-procurement service for medicines27 and maintains tight control
over purchases of particular tuberculosis28 and malaria29 medicines. Will
the Global Fund—and similarly funding/facilitating services such as those
offered by UNITAID,30 the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI),31

PAGENBERG IP REPORT (Bardehle Pagenberg, Düsseldorf, Ger.), 2010/I, at 6 (summarizing
a German Court ruling granting injunctive relief against a shipping agent who delivered
allegedly patent infringing MP3 players), available at http://www.bardehle.com/fileadmin
/bardehle/sonstiges/IP_Reports/IP_Report_2010_I.pdf. See also Trade Enforcement Act of
2009, S. 1466, 111th Cong. § 223(2)(C)-(D) (2009), and Customs Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Reauthorization Act of 2009, S. 1631, 111th Cong. § 234(a)-(d) (2009)
(supporting the inference that the enforcement agenda seeks to disrupt each and every link
in the distribution chain). See ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7, § 2, art. 2.4
(supporting the argument that intermediary liability will routinely extend to shippers by
including a direct reference to distribution and channels of distribution).
25
See ACTA, supra note 7, §2 art. 2.3(2) (obviously permitting the destruction of
APIs used in the “manufacture” of generic medicines).
26
About the Global Fund, available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/?lang=en.
27
See Global Fund Observer, AIDSPAN, http://www.aidspan.org/documents/gfo/GFOIssue-127.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2010) (“[Principal Recipients] from 37 countries . . .
have joined the Voluntary Pooled Procurement (VPP) system. Discussions are ongoing
with PRs from another 20 countries. The VPP has now registered 130 orders, with a total
value of $335 million. Ten countries have signed up for capacity building and supply chain
management assistance.”).
28
See THE GLOBAL FUND, GUIDE TO THE GLOBAL FUND’S POLICIES ON PROCUREMENT
AND SUPPLY MANAGEMENT 12 (2009) (“All procurement of medications for Multi-Drug
Resistant TB (tuberculosis) must be conducted through the Green Light Committee.”),
available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/
documents/psm/pp_guidelines_procurement_supplymanagement_en.pdf.
29
See Affordable Medicines Facility – malaria, THE GLOBAL FUND,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/Amfm/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).
30
See UNITAID, UNITAID CONST. §1, available at
http://www.unitaid.eu/images/governance/ utd_constitution_05-07_en.pdf (describing that
as part of the WHO, UNITAID’s express mission is to increase market impact on access to
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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SCMS,32 IDA Foundation,33 Medecins San Frontieres,34 and even
UNICEF35—fear that their access-to-medicines resources and activities
could have been considered intermediary services to third-party infringers
whose medicines might inadvertently violate a fictional in-transit patent rule
or an opaque in-transit trademark confusion rule?36 Even further afield,
could a drug regulatory authority that registered a generic medicine that
later violated a fictional in-transit patent rule or an in-transit trademark
confusion rule also have been held liable for intermediary-service
liability?37
Unfortunately, the switch to the concept of third-party enforcement in
the current ACTA text does little or nothing to allay the risks to access to
generic medicines described above. One can still gather information about
third parties with respect to means of production and distribution channels;
one may still seek temporary and permanent injunctions against third parties
to prevent infringing goods from entering channels of commerce, and in the
case of provisional measures also temporarily enjoin other alleged acts of
infringement; and the state may still impose criminal sanctions against those
who aid and abet criminal infringement activities.
In particular, there are many uncertainties in the meaning and scope of
application of these provisions with respect to the entering into the channels
of commerce concept. Distributors and transporters seem at particular risk
as they may directly enable a territorial infringement by transporting the
infringing product or content into the country of enforcement and thereby
place infringing products squarely in the middle of channels of commerce.
In addition, component suppliers might also be liable to provisional

HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria medicines by increasing market competition.).
31
See Clinton Health Access Initiative, http://www.clintonfoundation.org/what-wedo/clinton-health-access-initiative/ (describing the goals and purpose of CHAI).
32
See Supply Chain Management System, http://scms.pfscm.org/scms/about
(describing the mission and purpose of the SCMS).
33
See IDA Foundation, http://www.ida.nl/ (describing the mission and purpose of the
IDA).
34
See Medecins Sans Frontieres,
http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/content/medical/pharmaceutical/index.cfm?&mode=v
iew (listing information about MSF’s drug procurement policies and activities).
35
See UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/supply/index.html.
36
See THE GLOBAL FUND, supra note 28, at 20 (detailing The Global Fund’s current
requirements that recipients comply with national laws and applicable international
obligations in the field of intellectual property). Because of intermediary liability concerns,
will The Global Fund now have take on new duties to double-check and confirm the
intellectual property status of medicines purchases it finances under international law (the
TRIPS Agreement), the law of the country of use, and the law of every transit country?
37
Drug regulatory authorities typically assess medicines for quality, safety, and
efficacy and therefore register (or approve) the medicine for marketing within the country.
By doing so, drug regulatory authorities would arguably enable the lawful distribution and
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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measures since enjoining them could arguably prevent the offending
product from being made in the first place at the front end of the “entering”
into the channels of commerce continuum. Similarly, it is conceivable,
though perhaps not as likely, that other enablers of commercialization,
including procurement agents like Medicines San Frontiere and the
International Dispensary Association, funders like PEPFAR, the Global
Fund, and UNITAID, and regulators like drug regulatory authorities could
also be temporarily enjoined to prevent the commercialization and
distribution of alleged IP infringing products. Whether criminal “aiding and
abetting” extends to suppliers of subsidiary materials and other enablers,
who thereby contribute either to the production or commercialization of the
offending products, is perhaps less certain; but the possibility of criminal
liability is certainly troubling.
It is clearly possible that APIs and even inert ingredients can be used in
the manufacture of patent infringing products. Likewise, it is possible that
non-patent-infringing medicines might be intentionally or misleadingly
mislabeled so as to allegedly infringe a valid trademark. In these
circumstances and under existing law, the right holder ordinarily would
have full recourse against the infringer in the country of manufacture and/or
the country of marketing and use. However, it was undesirable to impose a
second tier of liability on third-party suppliers and distributors who often
lacked knowledge of the IP status of the product at issue. It would clog the
channels of commerce to require suppliers and shippers to double-check the
patent and eventual trademark status of all of their customers. In such
circumstances, suppliers and shippers might choose to boycott generic
manufacturers altogether rather than risk civil and perhaps even criminal
sanctions.38
Moreover, ACTA will still allow border/customs enforcement
procedures by right holders and ex-officio at export, in-transit, and import
borders with to respect to alleged trademark and copyright claims.39 Patentrelated seizures had previously been made based on the in-country
manufacturing fiction40 and thus could obviously have implicated third
sale of alleged IP infringing medicines and thus be subject to intermediary liability.
38
See ACTA Draft – Apr. 21, 2010, supra note 7, art. 2.15(2) and ACTA – Oct. 2,
2010, supra note 2, art. 2.14.4 (imposing criminal sanctions on those who aid and abet
willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial
scale).
39
ACTA, supra note 2, Section 3: Border Measures.
40
See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a Member State –
Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, WT/DS408/1 (May 19, 2010) (requesting
consultations over multiple European seizures of in-transit generic medicines on alleged
patent grounds, especially in the Netherlands, including one case involving AIDS
medicines purchased by UNITAID and being shipped from India to Nigeria), available at
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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parties had the coverage of the border measures provision not been changed
to exclude patents.41 Although trademark-related seizures have been
fewer,42 a third-party API supplier, procurement service, or shipper, could
still be alleged to have contributed to an eventual product that was
misleadingly or confusingly labeled. One plausible ground for mistaken
assessment of confusion might arise from the fact that both a brand name
and generic drug will display the required international non-proprietary
name (INN) for the active ingredient. Moreover, both the brand name
holder and the generic company might use portions of the INN in their own
brand names. In these circumstances, allegations of actionable trademark
confusion and of third-party liability could arise. Similarly, to avoid
confusion for consumers and to maintain bioequivalence,43 the trade dress
of a branded and generic medicine might also be appropriately similar but
trade-dress confusing.44 Once again, third parties might be held liable even
under border measures that are limited to trademark and copyright
violations. Moreover, in the unlikely event that the trademark issue rose to
the level of willful trademark counterfeiting on a commercial scale, thirdparty supplies and distributors could constitute criminal aiding and abetting;
an innocent supplier to a producer, who later turned out to be a willful
counterfeiter, could suddenly be deemed a criminal offender under Article
2.14.4 of ACTA.

http://www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds408-1(cr).pdf.
41
ACTA, supra note 2, footnote 6.
42
See Press Release, Health Action International, Another Seizure of Generic
Medicines Destined for a Developing Country, This Time in Frankfurt (June 5, 2009),
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/june-5-pressrelease-frankfurt-seizure.pdf (describing an in-transit seizure of generic Amoxicillin from
India to the Republic of Vanuatu by German customs officials on May 5, 2009, because of
alleged trademark confusion with GlaxoSmithKline’s off-patent brand name medicine
“Amoxil”).
43
Medicines are said to be bioequivalent if generic versions have the same mode of
administration (e.g., oral capsule or tablet) and the same rate of absorption and elimination
of the active ingredient(s) in the human body as the original, previously registered product.
Bioequivalence tests merely require a so-called crossover studies, involving a relatively
small number of human subjects, instead of the expense and delay of duplicative Phrase IIII clinical trials. See, e.g., Food and Drug Admin., Guidance for Industry: Statistical
Approaches to Establishing Bioequivalence (2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/ucm070244.pdf. Because the size and shape of a medicine can affect the
bioequivalence of a generic medicine with its comparator, generic manufacturers often
need to make their medicine’s trade dress (appearance) close to that of the originator.
Although generic manufacturers should never affix a trademark or to stamp a pill with the
originator’s brand, the overall similarity of appearance might reasonably confuse a customs
agent.
44
See Sean Flynn, Note on ACTA and Access to Medicines (2010), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/blog-post/note-on-acta-and-access-to-medicines.
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IV.

ACTA: Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines
ACTA NEGOTIATORS ARE PURSUING PHRMA’S ENFORCEMENT GOALS
BOTH IN ACTA AND IN TRADE AGREEMENTS

The European Commission, when releasing the April Predecisional
Draft, asserted that “ACTA will not hamper access to generic medicines.”45
However, the analysis above shows otherwise.
Confirming health
advocates fears, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) has advocated even more extreme and precisely defined
application. In PhRMA’s Comments to the USTR on ACTA (2008),
PhRMA wanted the Agreement to explicitly impose intermediary liability
on Internet Service Providers and other operators, on entities that engage in
parallel trade, on suppliers of APIs and other bulk pharmaceutical
ingredients, and on distributors of generic medicines.
1. PhRMA Recommendation: Establish liability for Internet
Service Providers and Other Operators that Facilitate Trade in
Counterfeit Medical Products. “Expressly prohibit online activities
that directly or indirectly facilitate trade in counterfeit medical
products and provide legal incentives for ISPs and online
intermediaries to cooperate with legitimate manufacturers in
combating counterfeiting activities. . . . We note that Korea recently
implemented a system for taking down web sites selling counterfeits,
and recommend examination of that system for possible adaptation
and use in other countries to combat online counterfeit medicines.”
2. PhRMA Recommendation:
Provide Effective Border
Enforcement against the Importation and Exportation of Counterfeit
Medical Products. “[W]ithout effective controls against diversion,
parallel trade in pharmaceuticals becomes a potential pathway for
the introduction of counterfeit medical products. ACTA members
should also be required to prohibit the distribution of medical
products diverted from legitimate distribution channels and such
distribution of diverted products should be treated as a
counterfeiting offense.”
3. PhRMA Recommendation: Ensure that criminal and
administrative remedies extend to all upstream and downstream links
in the drug counterfeiting channel, including the supply of
unauthorized bulk chemicals and the distribution of finished

45

Press Release, European Commission, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement:
European Commission Welcomes Release of Negotiation Documents (Apr. 21, 2010),
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=552.
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counterfeit products. “Effective anti-counterfeiting enforcement
depends critically upon law enforcement’s ability to block so-called
chokepoints in the counterfeiting manufacture and distribution
channel, from the upstream supply of raw materials to the
downstream distribution of finished products. In the case of
counterfeit medical products, this holistic approach to enforcement
necessitates effective enforcement tools and remedies to stop the
unauthorized manufacture and supply (both domestic and
international) of the bulk chemicals used to produce counterfeit
medical products, as well as measures to prevent the unauthorized
wholesale and retail distribution of counterfeit products.”46

Equally troubling is the fact that the U.S. and E.C. will not stop with
ACTA with respect to third-party enforcement. Even before ACTA, they
have incorporated provisions requiring enforcement measures against third
parties. For example, in the EU/Colombia/Peru EPA,47 there is an article on
provisional and precautionary measures, Art. 232, that states that “parties
shall provide that the judicial authorities may, at the request of the
applicant, issue an interlocutory injunction against any party intended to
prevent any imminent infringement…”48 Even more problematic are
provisions on injunctions, Art. 234. There, footnote 64 states that
injunctions can be applied not only against the infringer, but also against
those whose services have been used to infringe IPR to the extent that have
been involved in the process. The meaning of “involved in the process” is
remarkably imprecise. Pursuant to the preceding analysis, does it mean that
an NGO buying an allegedly infringing medicines will not be able to deliver
the medicines to its patients or that a drug regulatory authority can be
enjoined from registering a medicine?

V.

CONCLUSION

PhRMA and its ACTA negotiating surrogates have vigorous ambitions
that ACTA and other enforcement treaties be applied upstream and
downstream to manufacturing, supply, and distribution channels to stop
parallel and generic trade in medicines. Although their tools of preference
46

James Love, PhRMA Comments on ACTA: ISP Liability, Parallel Trade and
Generic APIs, Knowledge Ecology International, July 5, 2008, available at
http://keionline.org/node/73.
47
See http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17138.
48
This could potentially be used against NGOs or international medicines programmes
trying to deliver generics. However, this possibility depends upon national legislation
providing it, since the article starts by saying “in accordance with their domestic
legislation”. States therefore preserve their margin of maneuver.
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include broad inclusion of the intellectual property rights, border/in-transit
measures, and ubiquitous injunctions that might interfere with government
use licenses and judicially-granted royalty schemes, PhRMA and its captive
trade negotiators also want to use third-party enforcement measures to
dampen generic trade. The dangers to third parties under ACTA are not
limited to ISPs; the danger extends to all who contribute to the supply,
manufacture, registration, procurement, and distribution of generic
medicines that must go through the choke-points of international trade
where ephemeral and fictional patent and trademark-confusion rights might
prevent the cross-border trade of medicines lawfully produced in the
country of export and lawfully consumed in the country of import.
Although it is very late in the game to slow down the ACTA juggernaut,
which has now reached its final stages,49 there are still opportunities at the
national level to challenge the agreement substantively and procedurally.
Even if ACTA comes into force and is enacted in particular countries, much
can be done to corral its interpretation to minimize the reach of third-party
enforcement, to narrowly construe its jurisdictional reach, to strictly define
“entering into the channels of commerce,” and to limit aider and abettor
criminal liability. Health advocates must join forces internationally to
eliminate or reduce the risks to access to medicines codified in the proposed
ACTA text. Advocate can still try to forestall ACTA’s approval at the
national level and to narrow and ameliorate provisions in implementing
legislation that could adversely impact supplier, distributors and enablers of
generic trade in low-cost generic medicines of assured quality.

49

Press Release, Eur. Comm’n: Trade, Joint Statement from all Negotiating Parties to
ACTA (Oct. 2, 2010), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=623&serie=370&langId=en.
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